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Abstract The literature suggests there is about a 1 % risk
per year of a 10 % global agricultural shortfall due to
catastrophes such as a large volcanic eruption, a medium
asteroid or comet impact, regional nuclear war, abrupt
climate change, and extreme weather causing multiple
breadbasket failures. This shortfall has an expected mor-
tality of about 500 million people. To prevent such mass
starvation, alternate foods can be deployed that utilize
stored biomass. This study developed a model with liter-
ature values for variables and, where no values existed,
used large error bounds to recognize uncertainty. Then
Monte Carlo analysis was performed on three interven-
tions: planning, research, and development. The results
show that even the upper bound of USD 400 per life saved
by these interventions is far lower than what is typically
paid to save a life in a less-developed country. Further-
more, every day of delay on the implementation of these
interventions costs 100–40,000 expected lives (number of
lives saved multiplied by the probability that alternate
foods would be required). These interventions plus training
would save 1–300 million expected lives. In general, these
solutions would reduce the possibility of civilization col-
lapse, could assist in providing food outside of catastrophic
situations, and would result in billions of dollars per year of
return.
Keywords Agricultural catastrophe  Alternate
food  Global catastrophic risk  Intervention cost-
effectiveness
1 Introduction
A number of catastrophic events could cause a roughly 10 %
global agricultural shortfall, including a medium-sized aster-
oid/comet impact (Napier 2008), a large but not super vol-
canic eruption, full-scale nuclear war if the impacts are less
than anticipated (Turco et al. 1990), regional nuclear war (for
example, India-Pakistan (O¨zdog˘an et al. 2013)), abrupt
regional climate change (Valdes 2011), complete global loss
of bees as pollinators (Aizen et al. 2009), a super crop pest or
pathogen, and coincident extreme weather, resulting in mul-
tiple breadbasket failures (Bailey et al. 2015). Other events
would not directly affect food production, but still could have
similar impacts on human nutrition. Some of these include a
conventional world war or pandemic that disrupts global food
trade, and the resultant famine caused in food-importing
countries (Keller 1992; Waldman 2001; Goodhand 2003).
Other issues that do not affect food production directly
include overreaction to oil prices, phosphorus prices, nitrogen
prices, desertification, salinization, erosion, depletion of
aquifers, and slow climate change (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2013).
These all could occur with concomitant price speculation,
pricing the global poor out of food.
Generally, the technical solution for feeding everyone in
these scenarios would be to (1) increase cultivated area; (2)
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reduce the amount of preharvest losses (for example, from
pests and weeds) (Oerke 2006); (3) reduce yield under-
achievement (for example, because of insufficient fertiliz-
ers and not optimal plant varieties) (Foley et al. 2011); (4)
reduce food wasted in the process of distribution (Godfray
et al. 2010) and at the household level; and (5) reduce the
use of edible food for the production of biofuels and feed
for livestock and pets (Denkenberger and Pearce 2015).
Another solution to these problems is storing more food,
but this would be expensive and cannot be done rapidly
without exacerbating hunger among the world’s destitute
people (Baum et al. 2015). Thus, conventional approaches
to a 10 % global agricultural shortfall would not be ade-
quate to stop an escalation in current hunger-related disease
and death (UNICEF 2006).
Recently, 10 alternative food solutions that do not
involve conventional agriculture have been proposed for
global catastrophes (Denkenberger and Pearce 2014). Here
the solutions that would likely be the most relevant in the
event of a 10 % agricultural shortfall are discussed
(Table 1). One solution for an alternate is substituting for
human edible animal feed using the commercially
demonstrated technology that converts stranded (remote
from markets) natural gas to animal feed using bacteria
(Unibio 2014). Many other solutions involve converting
agriculture and logging residues to food/feed. For cellulose
digesters, such as cattle, sheep, and goats, as well as horses
kept as pets, the practice of feeding excrement from other
animals could be expanded. With this high-nitrogen food
source, lower-nitrogen sources could be used in addition,
such as agricultural residues that are not green and tree
leaves that have been depleted of their nutrients and shed.
For noncellulose digesting animals such as pigs, turkeys,
and chickens, as well as cats and dogs kept as pets, dis-
carded food waste can be used more extensively; this is a
new solution that was not very relevant for the 100 %
agricultural shortfall studied previously (Denkenberger and
Pearce 2014). Although much of the current food waste is
appropriate for human consumption, even food that is
regarded as spoiled by human standards could be accept-
able for animals (Henneberg 1998).
The difficulty of providing solutions is reduced for
such a relatively small percentage of agricultural short-
fall. Ideally, solutions would require minimum lifestyle
changes for everyone. A way of doing this is finding
alternate feed sources for livestock and pets. Grains
make up about half of global calorie production
(Meadows et al. 2004) and livestock consume 35 % of
the world’s grain (Earth Policy Institute 2011). There-
fore, if grains were completely replaced with alternate
feed sources in animal diets, this could make up for an
18 % global agricultural shortfall and would be more
than sufficient for a 10 % global agricultural shortfall.
This solution, however, does not even account for the
possibility of substituting non-grain edible food used as
animal feed (though animal only-feed such as grass
could be impacted by the catastrophe).
Another range of options enables direct human food
production from tree-related biomass, such as extracting
sustenance from leaves (for example, pine needle tea) (Kim
and Chung 2000), and mushrooms growing on woody
residues. The waste from this process can be fed to cellu-
lose digesting animals (Spinosa 2008). Another alternative
direct mechanism for providing human food from con-
ventionally non-food sources is utilizing current cellulosic
biofuel techniques. For example, enzymes could be used on
agricultural residues to create human edible sugars (Langan
et al. 2011). With the reclamation of nutrients from
excrement and food waste and the possible injection of new
nutrients into the food system from leaf litter, for example,
the need for artificial fertilizer would fall. This would
enable macronutrient (for example, nitrogen) fertilization
of part of the ocean, which could allow significant ramping
of fish harvesting (Denkenberger and Pearce 2015). Many
of these alternate food sources may be valuable even out-
side a catastrophe for reducing the world’s current under-
supply of food (FAO 2015) to the poorest people (Gwatkin
1980).
A 10 % global agricultural shortfall would roughly tri-
ple the price of grain (Bailey et al. 2015), which would be
expected to aggressively exacerbate global food insecurity.
Many of these alternate food solutions, if ramped up
Table 1 Human food sources and the alternate feedstock inputs for these foods
Food animals/pets Feedstock
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses Natural gas digesting bacteria, excrement, leaf litter, agricultural
residues, wood residue from growing mushrooms
Pigs, turkeys, chickens, cats, and dogs Food discarded by humans, natural gas digesting bacteria
Leaf tea Green leaves and agricultural residues
Mushrooms Woody residues
Sugar produced by enzymes Leaf litter, agricultural residues
Fish Algae grown because of ocean fertilization
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quickly to cover a 100 % agricultural shortfall individually,
could be much more expensive than the new high grain
price. However, in a 10 % agricultural shortfall, each food
source would only have to provide a relatively small
amount of food. Therefore, less extreme measures would
have to be taken, lowering the cost. These costs, however,
have not been quantified. Neither has the cost of each of the
alternative foods been quantified as a function of prepara-
tion and planning, research and development, and training.
In order to overcome this knowledge gap and provide
planners with better cost estimates on various alternative
food interventions, an analysis was performed here with a
numerical model to estimate the cost-effectiveness of (1)
planning at the international level; (2) investing in research
including experiments to prove the concepts; (3) the
development of the technologies to demonstrate scalability;
and (4) the training of professionals and citizens. For each
of the four interventions, five cost-effectiveness measures
were calculated: cost per life saved, benefit to cost ratio,
net present value, payback time, and internal rate of return.
The results are discussed and conclusions are drawn about
the cost-effectiveness of food security preparations for
global catastrophes.
2 Materials and Methods
This study developed a model (Fig. 1) using three inputs:
(1) the probability of a 10 % agricultural shortfall per year;
(2) the lives lost due to this 10 % agricultural shortfall
without alternative foods; and (3) the statistical value of a
life. These three inputs were used in quantitative analysis
software to determine the cost-effectiveness of planning,
research, development, and training. To determine each
model parameter, the available literature was surveyed to
estimate the model parameters. In many cases this is
straightforward and there is a high degree of confidence in
those inputs. However, in cases where no literature values
were available or the confidence was low in those values,
logic is employed with large error bounds to recognize the
uncertainty. Based on the confidence of a parameter an
appropriate probability distribution was chosen for the
parameter.
2.1 Modeling Environment
The modeling was implemented in Analytica 4.5. Com-
bining the uncertainties in all the inputs was performed
with a Median Latin Hypercube1 analysis with the maxi-
mum uncertainty sample of 32,000 (run time on a personal
computer was seconds). The assumption is that all the
uncertainties are independent except where noted.
In addition to identifying the input variables whose
uncertainties most affect the outputs, an importance anal-
ysis was performed using Analytica. This analysis uses the
absolute rank-order correlation between each input and the
output as an indication of the strength of monotonic rela-
tions between each uncertain input and a selected output,
both linear and otherwise (Morgan and Henrion 1990;
Chrisman et al. 2007).
2.2 Explanation of Credible Intervals
A confidence interval is typically used when there are data
for the likelihood of events. However, since most of the
events considered here have not occurred, the Bayesian
credible interval is used (Bolstad 2013). Table 2 summa-
rizes the credible intervals for all the input variables. The
upper and lower bounds for the probabilities of success of
the alternative food interventions should not be viewed as
hard limits, but rather as a logical progression towards
greater credible intervals of the probabilities of success
with aggregate of no preparation\planning\planning ?
research\planning ? research ? development\planning
? research ? development ? training.
2.3 Catastrophe Probability Distributions
There are three types of probability distributions used in
this study: (1) log-normal; (2) beta; and (3) gamma. Log-
normal distributions are used for a continuous probability
Fig. 1 Model overview
1 Similar to Monte Carlo, but better performing (Keramat and
Kielbasa 1997).
Int J Disaster Risk Sci 207
123
distribution of a random variable whose logarithm is dis-
tributed according to the normal distribution. The beta
distribution is a continuous probability distribution defined
on the interval [0, 1] (though this can be modified), which
is parameterized by two positive shape parameters that
appear as exponents of the random variable and control the
shape of the distribution to model the behavior of random
variables limited to intervals of finite length. The gamma
distribution is a two-parameter family of continuous
probability distributions used for cases with a large range
of values as it is a maximum entropy probability distribu-
tion for a random variable. The types of distributions used
for the variables in this analysis are summarized in
Table 2. Most of the distributions are lognormal, but this
was inadequate to produce reasonable behavior for two of
the variables. The overall conclusions are not very sensitive
to the choice of distribution type.
2.4 Probabilities
The following sections explain the rationale of the distri-
bution types and parameters for the variables in the model.
2.4.1 Probability of a 10 % Global Agricultural Shortfall
A 95 % confidence interval for the probability of a 10 %
global agricultural shortfall is estimated to be log-normally
distributed between 0.3 % per year and 3 % per year. The
lower limit corresponds to the sum of several fairly well-
quantified risks. The probability of a volcano eruption like
the one of Mount Tambora, Indonesia in 1815 (volcanic
explosivity index = 7), which caused ‘‘the year without a
summer’’ and famines in 1816 is about 0.1 % per year
(Mason et al. 2004). The probability of accidental full-scale
nuclear war is roughly 0.2 % per year2 (Barrett et al. 2013).
This would likely cause at least a 10 % global agricultural
shortfall, and probably a much higher shortfall (Turco et al.
1990). The probability of natural abrupt regional climate
change of roughly 10 C decrease in one decade is 0.01 %
per year, and an order of magnitude increase in this
probability due to anthropogenic emissions has been esti-
mated (Denkenberger and Pearce 2014). One estimate of
the probability of extreme weather causing a 10 % agri-
cultural shortfall is now about 1 % per year (Bailey et al.
2015). The Bailey et al. study found that this risk is
increasing, and if the other nonquantified risks are signifi-
cant, the actual risk could be 3 % per year or more.
2.4.2 Uncertainty in the Number of Fatalities Due
to a 10 % Agricultural Shortfall
The uncertainty in the number of fatalities due to a 10 %
agricultural shortfall is very large. On the optimistic
extreme, there could be aggressive government support or
charity such that the vast majority of the global poor could
generally afford sufficient food. If the crisis were only a
year or two, loans could be feasible, either to poor indi-
viduals or poor countries. The necessary conservation (less
waste, less food to animals, and so on) in the developed
Table 2 Credible intervals for all the input variables
Variable Distribution type 2.5–97.5 percentile
Probability per year of a 10 % global agricultural shortfall Lognormal 0.3–3 %
Number of fatalities due to a 10 % agricultural shortfall (millions) Gamma 20–2000
Chance of alternate foods working as planned with current preparation Lognormal 0.1–1 %
Chance of alternate foods working with a plan Lognormal 1–10 %
Cost of plan ($ million) Lognormal 1–30
Plan horizon of effectiveness (years) Lognormal 3–30
Chance of alternate foods working with plan and research Lognormal 3–30 %
Cost of research ($ million) Lognormal 10–100
Research horizon of effectiveness (years) Lognormal 6–60
Chance of alternate foods working with plan, research, and development Lognormal 7–70 %
Cost of development ($ million) Lognormal 10–100
Development horizon of effectiveness (years) Lognormal 6–60
Chance of alternate foods working with plan, research, development, and training Beta 9–90 %
Cost of training ($ million) Lognormal 10,000–100,000
Training horizon of effectiveness (years) Not applicable 10
Value of statistical life ($ million) Lognormal 0.003–3
2 This is found by taking the mean of a lognormal distribution from
0.01% per year to 1% per year.
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countries could be achieved by higher prices or rationing.
However, even if mass starvation is averted, generally
there would be more malnutrition and increasing suscep-
tibility to disease. The poor would be less able to afford
other lifesaving measures, and a pandemic would be more
likely. Even if food aid is available, it may not be possible
to get the food to the people who need it. Therefore, near
zero mortality is unlikely. At the same time, even with no
catastrophe, 6.5 million people die of hunger-related dis-
eases per year (UNICEF 2006). On the other extreme, there
could be food export restrictions or bans, as implemented
by India, Vietnam, Egypt, and China in 2008 (Helfand
2013) when the situation was much less serious. This
hoarding on a country level could also be coupled with
hoarding on an individual level. This could dramatically
reduce the food supply available to poor people.
Armed conflict could be in some countries’ best interest,
which could also aggravate famine (Keller 1992; Waldman
2001; Goodhand 2003). These wars could even evolve into
nuclear conflict, which would further impact food supplies.
One estimate of the number of people at risk of starvation due
to regional nuclear conflict is 2 billion (Helfand 2013). To
capture this very large variation in behavior, a gamma function
was used with a 95 % credible interval of about 20 million to 2
billion fatalities, with a median of 400 million.3 Figure 2
shows cumulative probability, so the vertical axis values of
0.025 and 0.975 bound the range. There are currently 870
million people who are chronically malnourished (Helfand
2013). These people could quickly starve if there were a sig-
nificant price increase (urban) or a significant reduction in farm
output (rural). However, once 400 million people have starved
to death (6 % of the current global total population), this would
free up significant food for the remaining people. Therefore,
400 million people starving to death is used as the median
(vertical axis value of 0.5 in Fig. 2). This distribution also
includes the uncertainty in the duration of the shortfall which
would run from 1 year for extreme weather to more than 10
years for nuclear war (O¨zdog˘an et al. 2013). The uncertainty
also captures the variation in the scope of the shortfall—it
could be fairly uniform globally or concentrated in either
developed or developing countries. If there are large regional
imbalances, shipping would be adequate technically
(Denkenberger and Pearce 2014), but there would be economic
and political difficulties.
2.4.3 Lives Saved and the Statistical Value of a Life
To calculate the lives saved, the expected lives saved in the
first year are multiplied by the time horizon. This is
because future lives saved are typically not discounted, and
the number of lives saved per year would likely increase
because of population growth. With an expected total lives
saved and cost of plan, the cost per life saved is calculated.
Most of the people who would die in an agricultural catas-
trophe would currently be living in global poverty. The most
effective interventions can save these people’s lives now for
only about USD 3000 per life (GiveWell 2015b). This is the
cost to save a life, not necessarily the value of a statistical life.
However, many people believe all people should be valued
equally, and closer to the developed country valuation of USD
1–10 million per statistical life (Robinson 2007). This is ques-
tionable operationally because the global poor may prefer
money to be spent on their own consumerism (for example, for
food now), rather than reducing risks to lower levels.
However, there will likely be some fatalities even in
developed countries. Because of the higher price of food,
people would be more willing to eat spoiled food and in
food scarcity-aggravated conflict scenarios, many rich
people could die. Therefore, an attempt was made to bridge
these perspectives with a lognormal distribution with a
95 % credible interval ranging from about USD 3000–USD
3 million per life. This has a median value of approxi-
mately USD 100,000 per life. One global compilation of
values of statistical lives (VSLs) indicated that the VSL
was roughly 100 to 200 times the gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita (Miller 2000). This study found a global
average VSL of USD 650,000. If the people were in dollar-
a-day poverty, this would imply roughly USD 50,000 for
the VSL. Since not all of the people who die in a catas-
trophe would be in dollar-a-day poverty, the USD 100,000
median VSL considered here is roughly consistent with
Miller (2000). Thus, for those who view lives as being
worth more, this analysis is conservative.
This allows the model to find a benefit to cost ratio; the
model conservatively ignores benefits other than lives
saved, such as lower food prices for people who would
have survived anyway. The total benefit minus the cost
yields the net present value (NPV). The payback time is the
number of years after the project has been completed for
Fig. 2 Cumulative probability of lives lost given a 10 % agricultural
shortfall and no alternate food (G is billion)
3 Gamma function parameters: alpha = 1.1, beta = 1 billion,
maximum = 7 billion.
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the expected benefit to pay back the cost. Since the pay-
back times are short, a good approximation of the internal
rate of return (IRR) is the reciprocal of the payback time
(Pearce et al. 2009).
2.5 Cost-Effectiveness
Figure 3 shows the functionality within the research cost-
effectiveness module. The other cost-effective modules are
organized similarly. Though alternate foods may not pre-
vent all the fatalities in a given scenario, the probability of
alternate foods solving the problem could be thought of as
a larger probability only partially solving the problem.
2.5.1 Planning
With global cooperation (for example, sharing information
and trading food), it was estimated that these alternate food
solutions could feed everyone even without preparation
(Denkenberger and Pearce 2014). There is evidence in the
literature that humans are capable of such noble behavior in
a local crisis (for example, the famine in Ethiopia in
1984–1985) (Von Braun et al. 1999). However, this
assumption may be overly optimistic given counter
examples such as the Bengal, India famine in 1943 that was
much worse than the food supply shortfall (Lazzaro 2013).
Knowledge that everyone could be saved would facilitate
global cooperation, but still relatively few people know
about the solutions.
The equivalent probability that alternate foods would
prevent everyone from starving with current preparation is
quite uncertain. At least 700,000 people have heard about
the concept based on impression counters for the roughly
10 articles, podcasts, and presentations for which there
were data including Science (Rosen 2016) (out of more
than 100 media instances). It is also possible that, if there is
some warning before a catastrophe, people knowledgeable
about alternate foods could use the intense media interest to
inform the general public (including policymakers). It is
possible that given a catastrophe, people will independently
invent these solutions. Because of this, a lognormal prob-
ability distribution is assumed with a 95 % credible inter-
val of 0.1–1 % chance of alternate foods working as
planned with current preparation.
If there were an international plan for how efforts could
be coordinated to ramp up alternate foods given a catas-
trophe, the probability of success is expected to increase
significantly. This is especially true because a plan could
start to be implemented if there is warning before a
catastrophe. A lognormal distribution is assumed with a
95 % credible interval of 1 to 10 % chance of feeding
everyone with alternate foods in this case. There is overlap
between this distribution and the probability distribution of
alternate foods working with current preparation. It is not
reasonable that the addition of the plan would increase the
probability of success less than 1 %, so it is truncated at
1 %.
The cost of the plan is assumed to be lognormally dis-
tributed and have a 95 % credible interval of USD 1 mil-
lion–USD 30 million. The lower values correspond to a
few person years of planning plus briefing the relevant
individuals. The higher values would involve more con-
tinuous briefing and updating and allow for cost overruns.
The time horizon of the effectiveness of the plan is
assumed to be lognormally distributed and have a 95 %
credible interval of 3–30 years. Lower values are similar to
a presidential term, while higher values indicate more
maintenance. The probability of success, cost, and time
horizon of the plan are assumed to be independent, which
produces larger variances than reality, which is conserva-
tive with respect to the unfavorable bound of cost-
effectiveness.
2.5.2 Research
If targeted experiments and modeling of alternate foods
were performed, the probability of success would increase
significantly as this is the primary uncertainty in alternative
food proposals. A lognormal distribution with a 95 %
credible interval of 3–30 % chance of feeding everyone
with alternate foods is assumed with both a plan and
experiments. The improvement is truncated at 1 %.
It is assumed that the cost of the research is lognormally
distributed and has a 95 % credible interval of USD 10
Fig. 3 Research cost-effectiveness module
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million–USD 100 million. 445 tree species made up 76 %
of the growing stock in 88 countries (FAO 2005).4 It was
found that 100 tree species for half the global growing
stock is a reasonable order of magnitude estimate. How-
ever, even simply testing on one hardwood and one soft-
wood could have significant explanatory value because of
the significant differences in constituent compounds. For
solutions involving nonwoody biomass (for example, leaf
tea and enzyme-produced food), fewer species would likely
be required for a given fraction of biomass coverage. This
is because of the large fraction of nonwoody biomass that
are crops, and the domination of rice, maize, and wheat
among crops.5 For the fishing solution, relatively few
feedstock organisms (for example, algae) may need to be
investigated. For methane-digesting bacteria, only a few
different natural gas compositions may need to be tested.
There is also the issue of how many food organisms would
need to be tested. In the case of currently domesticated
animals like chicken and cattle, it would be relatively few.
However, it could be significantly more for other categories
like mushrooms. Other experiments include growing pho-
tosynthetic crops in the crisis conditions of the tropics (cold
and high ultraviolet radiation), biomass supply experi-
ments, and human nutrition experiments. It would be
valuable to synthesize existing experiments for relevant
insights. Further modeling of other issues such as energy
and water would be important.
The order of magnitude cost of a graduate student year
in the United States with some experimental facilities and
overhead is USD 100,000. A scientific paper can be pro-
duced in roughly 3 years when running a targeted experi-
ment like one organism consuming one feedstock type.
Therefore, the lower bound roughly corresponds to 30 such
studies. This would involve significant extrapolation to
other species. However, the upper bound would allow
about 300 studies, producing higher confidence. The brute
force method of testing hundreds of feedstock species with
many food species could cost billions of dollars. Using a
designed experiment approach the number of experiments
could be greatly reduced while yielding the majority of the
explanatory value (Myers et al. 2009). Research is gener-
ally longer-lived than planning, so the time horizon of the
effectiveness of the plan is estimated to be lognormally
distributed and have a 95 % credible interval of 6 to 60
years.
2.5.3 Development
If in addition to planning and research, development of
alternate foods outside the laboratory were achieved, the
probability of success would increase further. A lognormal
distribution is assumed with a 95 % credible interval of
7–70 % chance of feeding everyone with alternate foods
with a plan, research, and development approach. The
improvement is truncated at 1 %.
The cost of the development is assumed to be lognor-
mally distributed and has a 95 % credible interval of USD
10 million–USD 100 million, the same as for research. This
is because even though moving to a scale of production
outside the laboratory is more expensive for a particular
scenario, only the most promising scenarios would be
chosen. The lower values correspond to choosing the most
promising food and feedstock organisms and extrapolating
to other organisms. The higher values would involve more
organisms. This development would also facilitate the
estimation of costs given mass production. The same time
horizon is used as for research.
2.5.4 Training
If in addition to planning, research, and development,
catastrophe training were continuously implemented, this
would further increase the probability of success. Three
low-cost training options are described here. First, audio
and video training modules could be distributed by the
media after the catastrophe. Second, lower levels of gov-
ernment could be trained how to respond and to train
others. Third, public service announcements before the
catastrophe would ensure that nearly everyone knows about
the alternate food solutions and therefore will be more
likely to stay calm if a catastrophe occurs (this could even
be done as part of the planning intervention). More
expensive approaches would be training engineers and
technicians how to retrofit industrial processes for alternate
food production. Farmers could be trained on alternate food
production (for example, with school curricula).
If training involved 3 % of the global population, and
the sum of the cost and opportunity cost of the training
were USD 10 per hour, and it were 5 h per year, this is
roughly USD 10 billion per year. The lower bound could be
training 0.3 % of the global population similarly. The low-
cost options could be significantly less expensive than this,
but it is assumed that the training package is generally
larger than the other interventions. More money than the
upper bound could be spent to train the majority of citizens.
4 This statistic represented the 10 most common tree species in each
country. Therefore, there is some overlap of the most common species
across countries. The three most common species in each country
collectively covered 56% of the total growing stock. If linearly
extrapolated, this would imply 130 tree species for roughly half the
global growing stock. In reality, the fact that there are more countries
would increase the number of species. However, even though one
species was the third most common in a small country, it might not be
common globally. Therefore, this could reduce the number of species
required globally for half the growing stock.
5 Rice, maize, and wheat provide about 60 % of the world’s food
energy (Loftas and Ross 1995).
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However, because of food storage, it is not critical that
alternate food production begin immediately and it is
assumed that the media can be restored quickly (if the
catastrophe even disrupts media services in the first place)
to disseminate the message. If direct apprenticeship is
required, as long as this is of short duration, such as weeks,
it could quickly spread exponentially through the popula-
tion. Therefore, there will be diminishing returns for
additional training before the catastrophe. A beta distri-
bution (to avoid truncation) is assumed with a 95 %
credible interval of 9–90 % chance of feeding everyone
with alternate foods with a plan, research, development,
and training.6 The improvement is truncated at 1 %. The
cost of the training is assumed to be lognormally dis-
tributed and has a 95 % credible interval of USD 10 bil-
lion–USD 100 billion. In this case, it is assumed that the
training is over a specific period of 10 years.
3 Results and Discussion
The credible intervals are increased as multiple variables
are combined. This means that the reliability of the final
result is the same as the reliability of the input intervals.
Table 3 shows the 95 % credible interval for the five cost-
effectiveness measures for each of the four interventions.
The 2.5 percentile row has all the lower values in the
distribution, and the 97.5 percentile row has the higher
values. Sometimes low values indicate high cost-effec-
tiveness, and sometimes they indicate low cost-effective-
ness, so there is not a consistent scenario across the row.
For the plan, research, and development, even the upper
bound of USD 400 per life saved is significantly lower than
the minimum that is paid to save a life in global poverty.
Many of these alternative food interventions are able to
provide greater food security to the world’s most destitute
now. The value of these lives saved (which could amount
to over 17,000 lives/day) was not factored into the calcu-
lations here, making all of these calculations exceptionally
conservative. With the very high benefit to cost ratio, only
investing millions of dollars yields billions or even trillions
of dollars of benefits. The strikingly short time to pay back
the investment once the project is completed demonstrates
the urgency of completing these projects. In reality, to
maximize benefit, it would make sense to spend more
money to accelerate the project, including having interim
deliverables.
Full-scale training is significantly less cost-effective
because it is so much more expensive than the other
options. Still, the median cost per life saved is USD 6000,
which is similar to the best global poverty interventions
such as mosquito bed nets for malaria prevention (Give-
Well 2015a). Therefore, it is likely beneficial to implement
at least some training activities. The opportunity cost of not
implementing these interventions was estimated. The
probability of feeding everyone given no interventions was
subtracted from the probability of success given all four
interventions, truncated at an improvement of 4 % (the sum
of the individual minimum improvements). The result was
that every day delay of the implementation of these inter-
ventions costs 10 to 40,000 expected lives. Overall, the
four interventions taken together would save between 1
million and 300 million lives.
For the costs per life saved, the mortality of the catas-
trophe without alternate foods was the most important
input variable by a significant margin. However, the other
cost-effectiveness metrics depended on the statistical value
of life, while the costs per life saved do not. For these other
cost-effectiveness metrics, the most important variable was
the statistical value of life. For this sensitivity analysis, the
mortality of the catastrophe without alternate foods is made
into an independently sampled probabilistic parameter,
with values of 20 million, 200 million, and 2 billion.
Similarly, the values used for the statistical value of life are
USD 1000, USD 30,000, and USD 1 million. Besides the
statistical value of life not affecting the cost per life saved,
these variations affect all 20 cost-effective measures in the
same way. The NPV value of the plan is chosen to illustrate
the effect in Table 4. When the mortality is being varied,
the statistical value of life retains its regular distribution.
Similarly, when the statistical value of life is being varied,
the mortality retains its regular distribution. The variation
in NPV due to these sensitivity studies is smaller than the
variation in cost per life saved due to the independent
variation of all the input variables. Therefore, the distri-
butions shown in Table 3 can be thought of as a form of
sensitivity analysis.
The planning and research can be done in parallel. The
development should be done after the research in order to
focus on the feed organisms that are most promising. The
expected mean cost-effectiveness of training is still good,
and this could be done in parallel with development. Seen
as a program, the first year could be a few tens of millions
of dollars to plan and research. Then successive years could
be billions of dollars per year, mostly for training, but a
little for development.
These solutions would reduce the possibility of civi-
lization collapse. If civilization collapsed, it is not guar-
anteed that it would recover, so it could affect many future
generations (Beckstead 2013). These considerations further
demonstrate how conservative the analysis is. These solu-
tions could also protect biodiversity (Baum et al. 2016). If
there were mass starvation, not only would few humans
care about protecting other species from the impacts of the6 Beta parameters: X = 2, Y = 2, minimum = 0, maximum = 1.
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catastrophe, but humans would actively eat some species to
extinction. Clearing land to expand conventional agricul-
ture would negatively affect biodiversity. Therefore,
alternate foods, by reducing the chance of mass starvation,
would have important environmental benefits.
There are also catastrophes that could cause order of
magnitude 100 % agricultural shortfall for years, such as a
large asteroid/comet impact (Napier 2008), a super vol-
canic eruption (Rampino 2008), and nuclear winter. These
are generally lower probability events. Globally there is
less than 1 year of food storage (Do et al. 2010), so
alternate food would be required to feed everyone. The
economics of interventions in this case have been analyzed
for the United States, but future work is needed to analyze
the economics of interventions for this case globally. Since
many of the interventions for the order of magnitude 10 %
agricultural shortfalls would ameliorate the order of mag-
nitude 100 % agricultural shortfalls, this further under-
scores the conservatism of the cost-effectiveness of these
interventions. Additional work is also needed to quantify
the value of developing alternative food approaches now to
help reduce mortality from hunger and hunger-related
diseases in the present.
The limitations of this study were primarily the lack of
data that resulted in sometimes large ranges in the vari-
ables. Future work is needed to better focus the analysis
and to reduce the uncertainties. For example, experiments
on a few of the alternative foods could provide more robust
values of study duration, which would provide a tighter
range on the costs of research.
4 Conclusion
There is approximately 1 % risk per year of a 10 % global
agricultural shortfall. This has a mean expected mortality
of 500 million people given this shortfall. Alternate foods,
which exploit fossil fuels or stored biomass as a feedstock,
could save everyone from starving in such a catastrophe.
However, current awareness is low and the technologies
need to be better developed to provide this insurance.
Three interventions costing in the tens of millions of dol-
lars are planning, research, and development. The results of
this study show that even the upper bound of USD 400 per
life saved by these interventions is far lower than what is
typically currently paid to save a life in a less-developed
country. The lower bound of these interventions is about
USD 0.30 per life saved. Every day delay on the imple-
mentation of these interventions costs 100–40,000 expec-
ted lives. Overall, the four interventions taken together
would save between 1 million and 300 million expected
lives (lives saved in the event of a 10 % global agricultural
shortfall multiplied by the probability of the catastrophe).
In general, these solutions would also reduce the proba-
bility of civilization collapse and help protect biodiversity.
Table 3 95 % credible interval for the five cost-effectiveness measures for each of the four interventions
Intervention Cost effectiveness
measure
Cost per life
saved ($)
Benefit to
cost ratio
NPV ($
billion)
Payback
time (years)
Internal rate
of return
(%/year)
Plan 2.5 percentile 0.3 30 0.2 0.00,002 400
97.5 percentile 300 500,000 2000 0.3 5000,000
Research 2.5 percentile 0.3 20 0.8 0.00,006 100
97.5 percentile 400 400,000 10,000 0.7 2000,000
Development 2.5 percentile 0.2 20 0.8 0.00,003 100
97.5 percentile 400 700,000 20,000 0.7 3000,000
Training 2.5 percentile 200 0.02 -60 0.02 0.2
97.5 percentile 700,000 500 10,000 600 5000
Table 4 Plan cost per life saved sensitivity with respect to mortality and VSL
Mortality of catastrophe Plan NPV ($ billion) Value of statistical life Plan NPV ($ billion)
20 million 20 $1000 2
200 million 200 $30,000 70
2 billion 2000 $1 million 2000
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